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CHAPTER 5 
Equity and Equity Practice 
LEO A. REED 
§5.1. Right to a jury trial in equity. In suits in equity, involving 
cases and matters arising under the general principles of equity juris-
prudence, the parties are not entitled as of right to a trial by jury. 
Article XV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights has been con-
strued as preserving the right to a trial by jury only in those cases 
where such right existed at the time the article was adopted in 1780.1 
In cases where the plaintiff has an election to bring an action at law 
or a suit in equity and commences a suit in equity, for the purpose of 
obtaining an equitable remedy, there exists no absolute right to a 
trial by jury by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff desires a trial by jury 
it becomes a matter of discretion with the trial court.2 
In some cases the defendant may assert a constitutional right to a 
trial by jury. Thus where the plaintiff's cause of suit is based upon a 
legal cause of action and the plaintiff comes into equity for the purpose 
of obtaining an equitable remedy, such as one provided by the so-
called "reach and apply" statutes, now found in G.L., c. 214, §3, cls. 
(7)-(10), the defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by jury as 
to his indebtedness.3 
The question of the plaintiff's right to a trial by jury was re-
examined in the case of McAdams v. Milk.4 The plaintiff instituted 
an action at law based upon the alleged alienation of the affections 
of the plaintiff's wife. Both parties claimed trial by jury. Thereafter 
the plaintiff was permitted to amend the action at law into a suit in 
equity for the purpose of reaching and applying certain shares of stock 
or interests of the defendant in a named corporation.5 The plaintiff 
LEO A. REED is Assistant Clerk for the Commonwealth and Equity, Superior Court 
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§5.1. 1 Parker v. Simpson, 180 Mass. 334, 62 N.E. 401 (1902). 
2 C.L., c. 214, §§34, 36; Ross v. New England Mutual Insurance Co., 120 Mass. 
113 (1876). 
3 Powers v. Raymond, 137 Mass. 483 (1884); Stockbridge v. Mixer, 215 Mass. 415, 
102 N.E. 646 (1913). 
4332 Mass. 364, 125 N.E.2d 122 (1955). 
5 See C.L., c. 214, §3(8). 
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thereupon filed a motion for jury issues as to the liability of the defend-
ant to the plaintiff. This motion was denied by the trial court "as a 
matter of discretion." The plaintiff thereupon claimed an exception 
to the denial of the motion and the action of the court in disposing of 
certain requests for rulings of law. A bill of exceptions properly pre-
sented the disposition of the motion and the requests for rulings. 
In view of the final decision, the ruling of the trial court on the 
requests for rulings needs no discussion. The main contention as-
serted by the plaintiff was that by amending into a suit in equity he 
had not waived the right to trial by jury, claimed when the cause of 
action was pending on the law side of the court. This point was de-
cided against the plaintiff. The general principle was followed that a 
plaintiff coming into equity has no absolute right to a trial by jury. 
This principle applies whether the suit in the first instance is com-
menced in equity or having been instituted as an action at law is 
amended into equity. 
The Court further stated that if the question of the plaintiff's right 
to a trial by jury were one of first impression the Court would be con-
strained to inquire more deeply into the reasons which led to a differ-
ence in the application of the constitutional right to a jury as be-
tween a plaintiff and defendant. 
§5.2. "Clean hands" doctrine. An unusual application of the well-
known "clean hands" doctrine determined the case of Weintraub v. 
L. & F. Realty CO.l The action was brought by a landowner to com-
pel the owner of an adjoining lot to remove a fence which blocked off 
an alleyway in which both parties had a common easement.2 The 
defendant brought a cross-bill to compel the plaintiff to remove a 
stairway it was maintaining in the same alleyway. The defendant was 
maintaining a similar stairway, which fact was pleaded in defense by 
the plaintiff in a move to invoke the clean hands doctrine. The plain-
tiff prevailed in both actions in the Superior Court, receiving, among 
other relief, a decree that the parties both had the right to maintain 
their stairways.s 
The defendant appealed only from the latter part of the decree. 
The fence, which had been the cause of the entire litigation, was 
completely forgotten when the case reached the Supreme Judicial 
Court. That Court assumed that the plaintiff's stairway interfered 
with the defendant's easement, but held that " ... inwthe circum-
stances the realty company is in no position to invoke the aid of a 
court of equity, for it is maintaining a similar structure on its side 
§5.2. l331 Mass. 711, 122 N.E.2d 379 (1954). 
2 Record, Exhibits I and 2. 
3 The basis for this finding seems at least worth noting. The Superior Court judge 
decided that the parties had acquired the right to maintain their stairways by ad-
verse possession, despite the fact that the two lots had been under a common owner-
ship only sixteen years prior to the commencement of this action. 
2
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of the passageway which interferes at least as much with Weintraub's 
easement." 4 
The clean hands doctrine, therefore, was made the determining 
factor, although neither party had relied heavily on it and the Supe-
rior Court judge had completely ignored it. 
The decision, so far as it holds that one who is violating the terms 
of an easement has no standing to complain against one who violates 
the same easement in the same manner, is consistent with the prior 
Massachusetts clean hands decisions.5 The case is unusual, however, 
in that the clean hands doctrine is brought into play after an affirma-
tive decree in favor of the plaintiff to prevent the defendant from 
questioning the decree on appeal. The past decisions have all in-
volved the use of clean hands as a defense to an action. 
No appeal was taken by the defendant from that part of the decree 
compelling him to remove his fence, defendant apparently feeling that 
appeal would be futile. It probably would have been, for it is ex-
tremely doubtful that the clean hands doctrine could have been 
pleaded by defendant based on plaintiff's maintenance of the stairway. 
The cases have limited use of the defense to those cases where the 
plaintiff's conduct was almost identical with that of defendant. Re-
lief has been granted where plaintiff's conduct has differed. Thus, 
one who was polluting a stream was allowed relief against one who 
was obstructing it,6 one who had violated an equitable servitude by 
building too close to the street line could prevail over one who vio-
lated the same restriction by using her property for commercial uses; 7 
and it was not available to the defendant to show that the plaintiff 
had been guilty of fraud on a third party,8 or of violating a statute.9 
The rule of clean hands, it has been said, "does not have reference to 
'a general depravity' of the plaintiff unrelated to the subject mat-
ter." 10 
§5.3. Fraudulent conveyance: Bill to reach and apply. The exe-
cution of an otherwise unenforceable trust was assailed as a fraud-
ulent conveyance in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Pollock.1 A 
judgment creditor brought a bill to reach and apply certain shares of 
corporate stock which the defendant allegedly owned, in order to sat-
4331 Mass. at 713, 122 N.E.2d at 380. 
5 See Howe v. Chmielinski, 237 Mass. 532, 130 N.E. 56 (1921); CorneIIier v. Haver-
hill Shoe Manufacturers' Assn., 221 Mass. 554, 109 N.E. 643, L.R.A. 1916C 218 (1915); 
Rudnick v. Murphy, 213 Mass. 470, 100 N.E. 643, Ann. Cas. 19I4A 538 (1913). 
6YarkiII v. Thibault, 273 Mass. 266, 173 N.E. 504 (1930). 
7 Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 N.E. 936 (1901). 
8 Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N.E. 817, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 201, 122 Am. 
St. Rep. 232, 11 Ann. Cas. 332 (1907). 
9 Braga v. Braga, 314 Mass. 666, 51 N.E.2d 429 (1943). 
10 Westhampton Reservoir Recreation Corp. v. Hodder, 307 Mass. 288, 292, 29 
N.E.2d 913, 915 (1940). 
§5.3. 1 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 513, 126 N.E.2d 373. 
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isfy a New York judgment. The defendant's wife was joined as a 
party defendant and it was claimed that the transfer of stock to her 
was a fraud on the creditors. 
The lower court found that the husband had never held more than 
the bare legal title, concluded that the transfer was not fraudulent, 
and dismissed the bill. The evidence showed that shares of stock had 
been paid for by the wife and others and title taken in the husband's 
name. On these facts, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the 
husband held the stock in trust for the persons who had advanced the 
money and this transfer was not a fraud on the creditors, since it did 
not diminish his estate.2 
The decision is consistent with prior cases in Massachusetts and 
elewhere which hold that a creditor cannot attach the res of an unen-
forceable trust held by the debtor as a trustee once the trust has been 
fully executed. The rationale of all these cases is that equity will not 
undertake to prevent one from doing voluntarily that which he should 
in good conscience do, even though it could not, because of the Stat-
ute of Frauds or for other reasons, enforce the trust. An earlier Mas-
sachusetts case holding the opposite viewS has long since been o)rer-
ruled and the later cases are in harmony with the universal holding 
elsewhere. 
Despite the failure of the action as a bill to reach and apply, the 
plaintiff was still held entitled to a decree establishing the debt and 
ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff. 
§5.4. Masters in equity. Several cases decided during the SURVEY 
year involved the powers and duties of masters and the procedure fol-
lowed by courts in reviewing their actions. 
Shaw v. United Cape Cod Cranberry CO.l was an action for an ac-
counting of sums claimed to be due from the defendant for the plain-
tiff under a contract between the parties. The case was referred to a 
master who heard the evidence and made his report. The trial judge 
denied motions by the plaintiffs to recommit, overruled the plaintiff's 
exceptions and entered a final decree from which the plaintiff ap-
pealed. 
One of the plaintiff's exceptions was to the failure of the master to 
report the evidence, but in the absence of such a direction in the rule 
appointing him the master is not required to report evidence at the 
request of either party.2 Reports of evidence are to be distinguished 
from the summaries of evidence provided for in Rule 90 of the Supe-
2 Citing Stratton v. Edwards, 174 Mass. 374, 54 N.E. 886 (1899); Bailey v. Wood, 
211 Mass. 37, 97 N.E. 902, Ann. Cas. 1913A 950 (1912); Hutchins v. Mead, 220 Mass. 
348,108 N.E. 67 (1915); Liberty Trust Co. v. Hayes, 244 Mass. 251, 138 N.E. 582 (1923); 
Fergusen v. Winchester Trust Co., 267 Mass. 397. 166 N.E. 709, 64 A.L.R. 573 (1929). 
3 Smith v. Lane. 3 Pick. 205 (Mass. 1825). 
§5.4. 1 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 629. 127 N.E.2d 296. 
2 Leventhal v. Jennings. 311 Mass. 622. 42 N.E.2d 595 (1942); Rosman v. Rosman. 
302 Mass. 158, 19 N.E.2d 41 (1939). 
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rior Court Rules of 1954. The summaries of evidence provided for in 
Rule 90 are not for the purpose of reviewing the findings of fact made 
by the master but are solely for the purpose of enabling the court to 
determine the questions of law raised by the exceptions to the report. 
Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that in the ab-
sence of an objection filed with the master as to a ruling of law made 
by him and a request for a summary as provided for in Rule 90, the 
motion to recommit was addressed to the discretion of the judge and 
his denial of the motion to recommit the matter to the master for a 
report of the evidence was affirmed. 
A similar problem was presented by Stone v. Malcolm,3 another suit 
for an accounting. This case was also referred to a master, before 
whom the plaintiffs made some fifty-nine requests for findings and 
rulings. Thirty-five exceptions were taken to the master's report, 
which was confirmed by the Superior Court, and the plaintiff appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that a master may receive requests 
of findings of fact and rulings of law as an aid in coming to a correct 
decision. However, the master is not required to make the findings 
requested or to give his reasons for not doing SO.4 
A master in a suit in equity is required to be as impartial as a judge, 
and it is a rare occasion when a master's impartiality is questioned. 
Such a case was Mulcahy & Dean, Inc. v. Hanley.5 This was an action 
by the lessee of certain real property against the lessor who had repos-
sessed the premises. The case was referred to a master, who had first 
been suggested by the defendant's attorney, and to whose appoint-
ment all parties agreed. After the master found for the plaintiff, 
the defendant moved that his report be discharged for alleged bias. 
It appeared that a cousin of the master was one of the trustees of the 
Pratt estate, the beneficiary of which is the wife of the owner of half 
the stock of the plaintiff corporation. The Court held such facts in-
sufficient to establish bias on the part of the master and the decree 
confirming his report was affirmed. 
§5.5. Unfair competition. A purported non-competition agreement 
was before the Court in Horvitz v. Zalkind. 1 The plaintiffs and the 
defendant were stockholders in a corporation selling furniture in and 
around Fall River. In 1951, the plaintiffs bought out the defendant 
and he agreed that he would not, for ten years thereafter, open any 
store or be employed by any store selling furniture whose physical 
location should be within twenty miles of Fall River except in Provi-
dence, Rhode Island. He also agreed not to use the corporation's 
name in connection with any furniture store owned or operated by 
31955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 673, 127 N.E.2d 572. 
4 Citing Manfredi v. O'Brien, 282 Mass. 458, 185 N.E. 365 (1933); Tuttle v. Corey, 
245 Mass. 196, 140 N.E. 249 (1923); Resnick v. W. J. Young, Inc., 324 Mass. 668, 88 
N.E.2d 349 (1948). 
5332 Mass. 232, 124 N.E.2d 261 (1955). 
§5.5. 1332 Mass. 125, 123 N.E.2d 382 (1954). 
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him. Soon after the sale the defendant opened an office in Fall River 
and started selling furniture from catalogues or by taking his custom-
ers to the Boston wholesale houses. Plaintiffs sought an injunction, 
relying on the settled Massachusetts cases holding that for the seller 
of a buiness to go into competition with his purchaser derogates from 
the grant made by the sale.2 
The Supreme Judicial Court, affirming a decree dismissing the bill, 
held that where what the defendant could do and what he could not 
do were so expressly stated in the agreement, no promise respecting 
future competition with the corporation can reasonably be implied. 
"The emphasis of the agreement," wrote Mr. Justice Williams, "was 
upon the restriction of the defendant's right to open a store within 
the Fall River area or to accept employment by a store therein lo-
cated. These restrictions did not purport to restrain the defendant 
from all activities in connection with the furniture business in the 
Fall River area ... " It appears that the plaintiffs were the victim of 
their own predilection for minute detail in the agreement. A general 
agreement not to compete would probably have been construed to in-
clude the defendant's conduct. 
2 Martin v. Jablonski, 253 Mass. 451, 149 N.E. 156 (1925); Old Corner Book Store 
Y. Upham, 194 Mass. 101, 80 N.E. 228 (1907). 
" 
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